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INTRODUCTION 
My work in the economics of innovation began some forty years 
ago. I realized, as I was beginning my work on the Economics of 
Information, that knowledge and information are very similar.1 In 
fact, you can view information as a particular kind of knowledge, and 
so the problems that I was analyzing at the time, such as how well the 
market economy deals with information, corresponded to the 
question of how well the market economy deals with knowledge. My 
work showed that the standard paradigm (the neoclassical model, 
which argued that well-functioning markets solved all economic 
problems) just did not work when information was imperfect and 
endogenous (that is, could be affected by what individuals or firms 
did), and, by extension, when knowledge is endogenous (that is, when 
technology is changing). Adam Smith’s theory argued that individuals 
in pursuit of their self-interest (firms in pursuit of maximizing profits) 
were led as if by an invisible hand to the general well-being of 
society.2 One of the important results of my work, developed in a 
number of my papers, was that the invisible hand often seemed 
invisible because it was not there.3 
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 1. See J.E. Stiglitz, Information and Economic Analysis, in CURRENT ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS 27, 27–28 (J.M. Parkin & A.R. Nobay eds., 1975). 
 2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776). 
 3. E.g., Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with 
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 QUART. J. ECON. 229, 230 (1986) (providing 
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This led me to a certain degree of skepticism about the standard 
perspectives on intellectual property. When I was at the Council of 
Economic Advisors4 we opposed the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS), part of the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations. Interestingly, so did the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy. We were not alone in our opposition; 
indeed, it was a view held by many, if not most, of the people who 
understood the issues. These views stood in contrast to the views of 
most of the people who had some special interest on this issue, 
particularly from the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries, 
who argued that the stronger the intellectual property rights the 
better. When I went to the World Bank,5 I continued to be involved in 
the issue. We had concluded that what separates developed and 
developing countries is not just the disparity, the gap, in resources, 
but also the disparity in knowledge, and closing that gap in knowledge 
is an essential part of successful development. We had become 
concerned that TRIPS might make access to knowledge more 
difficult—and thus make closing the knowledge gap, and 
development more generally, more difficult. We also worried about 
the effects of TRIPS on access to life-saving medicines; TRIPS 
attempted (successfully) to restrict access to generic medicines, 
putting these drugs out of the financial reach of most in the 
developing countries. The World Bank has an annual report called 
the World Development Report, which highlights a key development 
issue every year. During the first year I was at the World Bank, we 
focused on the problems of knowledge for development.6 That year’s 
report argued that TRIPS imposed an unbalanced intellectual 
property regime.7 
 
the basic theoretic analysis showing that markets with incomplete risk markets and imperfect 
information are not (constrained) Pareto optimal, that is, taking into account the costs of 
obtaining information or creating markets, there are government interventions that can make 
some individuals better off without making anyone else worse off); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The 
Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics, in INFORMATION STRATEGY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 12, 15 (David Vines & Andrew Stevenson eds., 1991). 
 4. I served as a member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1993 
to 1997, and chairman and a member of the cabinet from 1995 to 1997. 
 5. I served as its chief economist and senior vice president from 1997 to 2000. 
 6. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/1999: KNOWLEDGE 
FOR DEVELOPMENT (1999), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS 
ContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_98111703550058/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 33–36. One of my minor victories was that I anticipated the U.S. Treasury’s 
unhappiness with our stance. At the meeting of the board of the World Bank where this was 
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Intellectual property has become one of the major issues of our 
global society. Globalization is one of the most important issues of 
the day, and intellectual property is one of the most important aspects 
of globalization, especially as the world moves toward a knowledge 
economy.8 How we regulate and manage the production of 
knowledge and the right of access to knowledge is at the center of 
how well this new economy, the knowledge economy, works and of 
who benefits. At stake are matters of both distribution and efficiency. 
Like most academics, I have ambivalent feelings about 
intellectual property, illustrated by two personal stories. About 
twenty years ago I received a letter from a Chinese publisher asking 
me to write a preface to a pirated edition of one of my textbooks. As 
an academic, I was enthusiastic about the idea. The motivation of 
much academic writing is not to make money but to influence ideas 
and to shape the intellectual debate. China at the time was beginning 
the transition to a market economy: if my book helped shape that 
transition in a way that enhanced its likely success in raising the living 
standards of more than a billion people, it would have been a major 
accomplishment. Looking at it even in more narrow terms, if even 1 
percent of China’s billion people read my book, it would be a larger 
readership than I would ever get in America. My publisher, of course, 
 
discussed, we welcomed India’s criticism that we had not gone far enough in criticizing TRIPS. 
Right after the U.S. representative gave the predictable speech about how we were “soft” on 
intellectual property and had to revise our report, India spoke up, followed by a couple of other 
countries, saying how our report was in fact very unbalanced with too much pro–intellectual 
property language. After their strong criticism, the United States decided not to pursue the issue 
any more, lest they actually wind up with a report that was less favorable than the report that we 
had written. The final document reflected our more balanced judgment. 
Since then, the developing countries have further articulated their concerns. At the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), they have called for a Development Oriented 
Intellectual Property Regime. See WIPO, Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for 
the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. In a 
keynote address to the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed 
Countries, World Intellectual Property Organization, I further developed the case for a 
development oriented intellectual property regime. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Keynote Address at the 
Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed Countries, World 
Intellectual Property Organization: Towards a Pro-Development and Balanced Intellectual 
Property Regime (Oct. 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ 
jstiglitz/download/2004_TOWARDS_A_PRO_DEVELOPMENT.htm). Resolutions in support 
of a development oriented intellectual property regime were adopted by WIPO’s General 
Assembly in September 2004. 
 8. In my recent book, I devote a whole chapter to the problem of intellectual property. See 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 103–32 (2006). 
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was not as thrilled as I was about the notion of my ideas reaching the 
Chinese audience through a pirated version of my textbook. 
Later I was at a conference in Taiwan. At that time, I knew that 
intellectual property rights were not always strictly enforced there. 
During a break in the conference, I had a little time to go to a 
bookstore. As I went to the store, I had a debate in my mind about 
what I hoped to see when I arrived. On the one hand, there was the 
possibility that they had stolen my intellectual property, that they had 
pirated one or more of my books. As we all know, theft is a terrible 
thing, and stealing intellectual property is a form of theft, so that 
would have been terrible. The other possibility was that they had not 
pirated one of my books and stolen my intellectual property, that they 
had ignored me. As I walked to the bookstore, I came to the 
conclusion that being ignored is far worse than having one’s property 
stolen, and I resolved that I would actually be much happier if they 
had stolen my intellectual property than if they had ignored me. 
When I got to the bookstore, they had in fact stolen it, and I was 
relieved. 
These anecdotes make the point that researchers and academics 
want their ideas to be disseminated. They work quite hard, in fact, 
traveling all over the world to disseminate their ideas. By contrast, 
intellectual property attempts to restrict the use of knowledge in one 
way or another. Intellectual property is supposed to encourage 
innovation. I argue below that a poorly designed intellectual property 
regime—one that creates excessively “strong” intellectual property 
rights—can actually impede innovation. 
I.  THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY IN INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
The intellectual property regime is part of society’s innovation 
system, and its intent is to provide incentives to innovate by allowing 
innovators to restrict the use of the knowledge they produce by 
allowing the imposition of charges on the use of that knowledge, 
thereby obtaining a return on their investment. But it is important 
when thinking about intellectual property rights (IPR)—which 
include patents, copyrights, and various other parts of the intellectual 
property system—to realize that there are many other parts of 
society’s innovation system. There are other ways of financing and 
producing research—for instance, through universities and 
government-supported research labs. In fact, I would argue, perhaps 
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immodestly, that the most important ideas are those that are 
generated in universities, and many of the most important intellectual 
advances are not covered at all by the patent system. Look at the 
basic idea underlying the computer, Alan Turing’s “Turing Machine”: 
it was not protected by the patent system.9 Ideas like asymmetric 
information are not covered by intellectual property.10  
Another example of important innovations not driven by IPR is 
the open source movement, which has been particularly successful in 
software. Even when research is financed by firms, there are other 
ways of providing returns on knowledge instead of using patents, such 
as trade secrets and advantages that come naturally to the first 
entrants in a market economy. There are also other ways of providing 
incentives; one of them I will discuss is a prize system, which has 
actually been a part of the innovation system for a couple hundred 
years. I will argue that, from a societal perspective, prizes have 
marked advantages over the patent system. 
Our innovation system rests on foundations of basic research, 
and most basic research occurs within academia and government-
sponsored research laboratories. Monetary returns are only a small 
part of what motivates these researchers. Thus, the basic framework 
of what induces people to engage in research is really not reflected in 
the intellectual property regime. Obviously, research has to be 
financed. It takes resources, so the question is not just how we 
motivate research but also how we finance it. As I shall comment 
below, financing research through monopoly profits may be neither 
the most efficient nor the most equitable way of doing so. 
The key issue is the role of the patent system, or the intellectual 
property regime more broadly, within the economy’s innovation 
 
 9. Turing was interested in the question of what it means to be computable, that is, if one 
can specify a sequence of instructions, or an algorithm, which when followed will result in a 
completion of the task. Turing Machines are thus simple, abstract computational devices which 
help to investigate the extent of what can be computed. David Barker-Plummer, Turing 
Machines, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., Winer 2003 ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/turing-machine/. For more information, see 
generally DAVID LEAVITT, THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH: ALAN TURING AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE COMPUTER (2006). 
 10. These ideas have played a very important role, for instance, in modern financial 
markets, both in design and in regulation. Much of my earlier research focused on the analysis 
of markets marked by information asymmetries. Sometimes I might wish that intellectual 
property rights extended to such ideas; if they had, I would probably be in a different economic 
position than I am today, but it would have been detrimental for society had these ideas been 
“covered” by intellectual property. 
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system. To address the next issue, the design of the patent or IPR 
system more generally, one has to understand the limited (though still 
important) role of the IPR regime to address the next issue: the 
design of the patent or IPR regime. There are a host of questions, 
many of which absorb much of the energy of the lawyers involved in 
obtaining and fighting patents. These issues include what can be 
patented, the breadth of the patent, the standard of novelty, the 
procedures for granting and challenging patents, the rules for patent 
enforcement, and the notion of responsibilities as well as rights. 
For instance, to get a patent you have to disclose enough 
information that somebody could replicate what is being patented 
(though often firms try to get away with disclosing as little as 
possible).11 Disclosure has long been an important part of the patent 
and intellectual property regime;12 it is one of the reasons why IPR 
can enhance innovation: people can build on that knowledge. 
Knowledge is the most important input into knowledge. Interestingly, 
in some of the more recent intellectual property disputes, the notion 
of disclosure has been contested. Microsoft has, by most accounts, not 
wanted to disclose even its protocols (required for interoperability 
with applications). The European Union has insisted that it at least 
disclose specifications for its protocols13 and Microsoft has tried 
everything not to comply with the European Union’s requirement, 
even to the point of risking millions of dollars in fines.14 
 
 11. For the specification requirement applicable in the United States, see 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2000). 
 12. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1643–44 (2007). 
 13. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, para. 30, 
2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, 27 (EC) (“The Decision orders Microsoft to disclose the information that it 
has refused to supply and to allow its use for the development of compatible products. The 
disclosure order is limited to protocol specifications, and to ensuring interoperability with the 
essential features that define a typical work group network.”). The full text of the Commission 
Decision is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/ 
en.pdf. In September 2007, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities upheld 
the European Commission decision. Press Release No. 63/07, Court of First Instance of the Eur. 
Cmtys., The Court of First Instance Essentially Upholds the Commission’s Decision Finding 
that Microsoft Abused Its Dominant Position, (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://curia.europa. 
eu/en/actu/communiques/cp07/aff/cp070063en.pdf. 
 14. See Mary Jacoby, Second Front: Why Microsoft Battles Europe Years after Settling with 
U.S.—Suspicions and Missteps Keep Its Antitrust Case Alive; Guarding Rival Engineers—Spat 
over Encrypting a Disk, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2006, at A1; Kevin O’Brien, Microsoft, Trying to 
Avoid a European Fine, Defends Demand for Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at C12. 
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Furthermore, as with any property right, there are restrictions on 
the use of intellectual property. The fact that you have a property 
right does not mean you can do anything that you want with it. 
Owning a bat does not give you the right to hit someone over the 
head with it. In the case of intellectual property, one of the 
restrictions is that you cannot engage in abusive, anticompetitive 
behavior.15 The rights of governments to issue compulsory licenses 
form another important part of the patent regime. One of the 
responses to the abusive, anticompetitive practices has been to 
restrict the use of patents, effectively insisting on compulsory 
licensing, sometimes through forming patent pools. In the consent 
decree in the case of the antitrust action against AT&T in the 1950s, 
AT&T had to make its patents available to anybody that wanted to 
use them.16 In my Tunney filing17 in the Microsoft case, I argued that 
one way of dealing with that company’s anticompetitive behavior was 
to limit its intellectual property rights.18 Such restrictions would, I 
suggested, enhance innovation in our economy. 
More generally, the design of the patent system can affect the 
efficiency of the economy and its innovativeness. The current patent 
system imposes large costs on the economy, and one of the questions 
is whether there are reforms that could increase the economy’s 
efficiency and innovativeness. I believe there are. To understand 
these issues one has to look at the economic foundations of 
knowledge. 
A. Static Inefficiency: Knowledge as a Public Good 
The important basic idea is that knowledge is a public good. 
Economists use the concept of a public good as a technical term; Paul 
Samuelson defined it precisely more than fifty years ago.19 A public 
 
 15. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (explaining that 
public policy “forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not 
granted by the Patent Office”). 
 16. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, at 71,139 (D.N.J. 1956). 
 17. Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jason Furman, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/ 
cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00030610c.pdf. Pursuant to the Tunney Act, members of the public 
have an opportunity to comment on a proposed settlement of a civil antitrust suit before it is 
accepted by a court. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(d) (2006). 
 18. Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz & Jason Furman, supra note 17, at 31. 
 19. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
387, 387 (1954). 
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good is a good whose consumption is nonrivalrous. By contrast, 
private goods can only be consumed by one person. For instance, only 
one person can sit in a chair. The same goes for food: if I eat the 
hamburger, you cannot eat it. Knowledge, however, is different. I 
have just shared with you some of the things I know, but sharing this 
knowledge with you has not taken away from what I know. Thus, 
knowledge has the quality of nonrivalrous consumption. 
Another way of putting it is that there is no marginal cost 
associated with the use of knowledge. Thomas Jefferson described 
this much more poetically. Jefferson said that knowledge was like a 
candle: when one candle lights another it does not diminish the light 
of the first candle.20 Understanding this concept is at the core of 
understanding efficiency in the use of knowledge. It is more efficient 
to distribute knowledge freely to everybody than to restrict its use by 
charging for it. 
Free distribution, however, could cause problems for creating 
incentives for the production of innovation, and that is the dynamic 
issue. Before turning to the question of dynamic efficiency, though, I 
want to emphasize that efficiency in use means knowledge should be 
freely available. The problem is that intellectual property rights 
circumscribe the use of knowledge and thus, almost necessarily, cause 
inefficiency. Not only does intellectual property create a distortion by 
restricting the use of knowledge, but it also does something even 
worse: it creates monopoly power. Monopoly leads not just to 
inequities but also to major distortions of resource allocations; 
limiting monopoly power and its abuses is the focus of anti-trust 
policy. There is a quandary. We not only tolerate this distortion and 
inefficiency by restricting the use of knowledge, which creates 
monopoly power, but we sanction it: it is part of our legal framework 
because we hope it will promote innovation. 
If we do not design this legal framework properly, however, it 
may actually impede innovation. That is where I will eventually take 
this argument. Before getting there, though, I want to point out that 
the social cost of the distortion of the patent system is particularly 
high. (By contrast, Schumpeter suggested that it would be lower than 
for other forms of monopolization.) 
 
 20. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). 
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1. Access to Medicine.  One of the reasons that the costs are so 
high is that the patent system impedes access to lifesaving drugs for 
billions. I opposed TRIPS (the so-called Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, part of the Uruguay 
WTO agreement signed in 1994) so strongly in part because of these 
effects. Indeed, I believe one of the main reasons the pharmaceutical 
industry was pushing for TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce 
access to generic medicines. These are so disliked by the drug 
companies for the same reason that they are so liked by everybody 
else: the prices of generic drugs are very low. The low price means 
that people who could not afford the brand name drugs still can buy 
the generic drugs, and the competition with the generics drives down 
the price of the brand name drugs. The loss of sales to generics as well 
as the lower prices in turn lowers the profits of the large (brand 
name) pharmaceutical companies; it is understandable why they have 
pushed so hard (and contributed so much to campaigns) for IPR. 
One example that shows the magnitude of what is at stake (and 
that has received a lot of attention), are the AIDS drugs. One year’s 
treatment of the brand name drugs, not the most recent ones, but the 
older ones which are less expensive, costs $10,000.21 In a poor 
developing country, where the per capita income is $300, or even 
$3,000, a person with AIDS is not going to be able to afford $10,000. 
They might be able to afford the generic medicines, which sell for less 
than $200. When the trade ministers signed the TRIPS agreement in 
Marrakesh in the spring of 1994, they were in effect signing the death 
warrants on thousands of people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere 
in the developing countries. This is one of the reasons that TRIPS has 
generated such immense concern.22 
 
 21. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIERÈS, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A 
PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (10th ed. Sept. 
2007, available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/diseases/hivaids/ 
Untangling_the_Web/UTW10_RSep_horizontal.pdf. 
 22. Defenders of TRIPS claim that it contained “flexibilities” to address these concerns—
the right to issue compulsory licenses. But the drug companies intended to make it difficult for 
developing companies to issue these compulsory licenses, and subsequent bilateral trade 
agreements have made it even more difficult. Had the intention been to retain access to life-
saving generic medicines for developing countries, TRIPS would have provided for an 
automatic right to issue compulsory licenses for expensive, life-saving medicines. The United 
States has put enormous pressure on countries that have threatened to issue compulsory 
licenses not to do so, and few have. 
The issue is not only of concern to developing countries. In the United States, with nearly 
47 million individuals not having health insurance and with health insurance often not paying 
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2. Leveraging Monopoly Power and Other Abuses of IPR.  The 
efficiency costs of IPR go beyond the direct effects associated with 
monopolization of the particular product covered by the patent: 
Intellectual Property Rights generate monopoly power that can be 
used to leverage further monopoly power. The most obvious example 
is Microsoft, which has leveraged its monopoly power in operating 
systems to obtain a dominant position in applications like word 
processing (Microsoft Office) and Internet browsers (Internet 
Explorer). The courts and regulators in the United States,23 in the 
European Union,24 and in South Korea25 have all ruled against 
Microsoft. There is little disagreement about the fact that Microsoft 
has engaged in abusive, anticompetitive practices. The only debate is 
what to do about it; because Microsoft has so much monopoly power 
and has obtained such a dominant position, it is not easy to figure out 
how to deal with the problem. 
There is actually a long history of abusive uses of intellectual 
property rights. Going back to the beginning of the last century, the 
automobile and the airplane were two of the most important 
innovations, and the development and success of both were impeded 
by IPR. In the case of the automobile, a patent was granted,26 but it 
was an excessively generic patent for a four-wheeled, self-propelled 
vehicle. The person who received the patent had no intention of 
developing the automobile; instead, he used it to form a cartel.27 
Often, the best, or at least the easiest, way of making money is not to 
come up with a better idea but to form a monopoly or a cartel and 
restrict competition. For those seeking easy profits, competitive 
marketplaces are very bad because they drive down prices and erase 
 
for newer drugs, the high prices also reduce access to life saving medicines. A striking example 
is the patent on the genes associated with breast cancer, which means that many women cannot 
afford the tests which can identify whether they are at risk. See text accompanying note 43. 
 23. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 24. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, supra note 
12; see also Stephen Castle, European Court Rejects Microsoft Appeal over Media Player, THE 
INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 23, 2003, at 33; Kevin J. O’Brien & Steve Lohn, European Court 
Faults Microsoft on Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007 at A1. 
 25. Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Findings of the Microsoft Case (Dec. 7, 2005) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Anna Fifield, S. Korea Watchdog Stands by Microsoft 
Ruling, FIN. TIMES (London), May 24, 2006, at 30; Choe Sang-Hun, Microsoft Loses Antitrust 
Case in S. Korea, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Dec. 8, 2005, at 13. 
 26. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed Nov. 5, 1895). 
 27. The case of the airplane raises a quite different set of issues, discussed at length in the 
next Section. 
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profits. IPR can be an important way of maintaining a cartel.28 Most 
of the automobile companies went along with the idea of the patent-
driven cartel, except for one. There was one innovator who had a 
different conception of what the automobile was about, and that was 
Henry Ford. He had the idea of a people’s car, at a low price; that 
idea was totally inconsistent with the cartel’s view of a high-priced, 
restricted-use vehicle. Ford challenged the patent.29 Had he not had 
the resources and the determination, he would not have succeeded in 
this legal battle; however, he eventually did prevail.30 Had he failed, 
the development of the automobile as we know it would have been 
delayed for a long time.31 
The automobile patent illustrates two other problems with the 
patent system: The first is the difficulty of determining the 
“boundaries” of property rights. In the case of “real” property (land), 
we can define the property right precisely by the geographical 
boundaries. We may have to further specify whether the property 
right extends to mineral rights and air rights, and whether there are 
public rights of way. But the limitations are easy to specify and are 
well understood. In the case of intellectual property, there are no 
such natural borders. Should the intellectual property right have 
extended to all self-propelled vehicles, or only to those that are 
propelled in a particular way? 
These boundary issues are related to another issue: it is widely 
agreed that if patents are to promote innovation, they should be given 
for, and only for, an idea that is “novel.” If the original patent is 
overly broad, and encompasses all four-wheeled, self-propelled 
vehicles, then a truly novel way of self-propelling may not be granted 
a patent or may have to pay the owner of the original patent so much 
as to attenuate incentives for innovation. Drug companies and others 
have tried to extend the effective life of a patent by making 
 
 28. The holder of the patent can impose conditions on those to whom he issues a license to 
use his patent—restrictions on output and pricing that allow the industry to act as a cartel. In 
effect, the patent owner acts as the cartel ring leader. This is an instance in which IPR gives rise 
to what Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia called the supreme evil of anti-trust. See Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). Whether, and 
under what conditions, such behavior would today be viewed as abusive remains controversial. 
 29. Did Not Infringe on Selden Engine—U.S. Court of Appeals Reverses the Decision of 
Lower Court Against Auto Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1911, at 5. 
 30. See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C. A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911). 
 31. Given the concerns about global warming, that might have been a good thing, but that 
was not one of the issues on the agenda at the time. 
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incremental improvements on existing drugs. In a recent case, Indian 
courts ruled against Novartis’ attempt to do so.32 
Whether a product is novel depends on the state of knowledge 
throughout the world. It is often difficult for the patent office to 
determine whether someone in the rest of the world might have had 
the idea before this patent was granted; in the case of the automobile, 
it is arguable that others in Europe had the idea before the granting 
of the 1895 patent. The United States has often been somewhat 
provincial in its approach to knowledge within the patent system. For 
instance, the United States gave a patent for basmati rice.33 Indians 
had been consuming basmati rice for a thousand or more years, but 
those in the patent office in Washington responsible for reviewing the 
patent application obviously had not had the pleasure of eating 
basmati rice. They thought it was a wonderful innovation and granted 
a patent to it. Had India implemented and enforced this patent, every 
time anybody in India ate basmati rice they would have to send a 
check to Texas to pay for this idea which they thought was theirs in 
the first place.34 
Ordinarily, property rights are argued for as a means of 
achieving economic efficiency; intellectual property rights, by 
contrast, result in a static inefficiency which can only be justified by 
the dynamic incentives. These examples suggest that the static 
inefficiencies may be greater than is often thought. Later, I will argue 
that the dynamic benefits may be less. 
Of course, any method of raising funds for innovation has a 
social cost. In the case of a monopoly, the way you raise funds is 
through the disparity between the price and the marginal cost. The 
patent system, however, is not an optimal way of raising money 
because it is not an optimal tax; it creates a particularly large set of 
distortions, which is one of the reasons why it is particularly 
objectionable.35 Later in this talk, I will discuss the issue of financing 
research more broadly. 
 
 32. Amelia Gentleman, Setback for Novartis in India Over Drug Patent Protection, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C1. 
 33. U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filed July 8, 1994). 
 34. This is an example of a more general problem which has received considerable 
attention in developing countries, called biopiracy, the patenting of drugs and other products 
based on traditional knowledge. 
 35. There are also equity issues associated with this particular way of financing research. 
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3. Schumpeterian Competition.  Standard competitive 
equilibrium theory has paid very little attention to innovation. The 
only rigorous proof of the efficiency of competitive markets is 
provided by the Arrow-Debreu model,36 and that model assumes that 
technology is fixed. One might think this is strange; how could 
economic theory pay any attention to models that assume technology 
is fixed in a dynamic economy? That is a question that sociologists 
ought to address, but the Arrow-Debreu competitive model is the 
standard, reigning paradigm, and sadly, it ignores innovation. Most 
first-year graduate courses in economics, and most introductory 
textbooks (until my textbook came out37), simply did not talk about 
innovation in any systematic way. But there was a strand of thought 
associated with Joseph Schumpeter that focused on innovation and 
argued that this competition for innovation resulted in temporary 
monopolies.38 One monopoly followed after another; new firms tried 
to displace the existing monopolist. In this sense, there could be 
intense competition. This kind of competition was referred to as 
Schumpeterian competition. 
Some of my earlier research, however, pointed out that 
Schumpeter was wrong about the temporary nature of monopoly. 
Monopoly power, once established, can easily be perpetuated.39 Not 
only is it possible to perpetuate monopoly power, in fact, there is an 
incentive to do so. This is particularly evident in the case of network 
externalities and in situations where there are important switching 
costs, such as those that arise from learning. That is one of the 
reasons why Microsoft is so difficult to deal with. The monopoly 
power persists even after the bad practices which enabled it to create 
that power have been terminated. 
 
 36. Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954). 
 37. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1993). 
 38. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 102 
(5th ed. 1976) (“[T]here is or may be an element of genuine monopoly gain in those 
entrepreneurial profits which are the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful 
innovator.”). 
 39. See Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed 
of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 27 (1980) (“[T]he belief that competition in R&D is a substitute 
for competition in the product market or that it will eventually give rise to competition in the 
product market has been shown to be suspect: there are conditions under which monopolies 
may persist even without any formal barriers to entry other than those provided by the patent 
system . . . .”). 
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4. Further Costs to the Patent System. The transactions costs 
associated with our IPR system are a further problem, although 
whether you view them as costs or benefits may depend on your 
position in the economy. For lawyers, transaction costs are a benefit, 
because they are a source of their income.40 But from a social 
perspective, these administrative costs are a social cost. Litigation 
over patents also introduces uncertainty. Of course, there is always an 
intrinsic uncertainty of research, but it is compounded by the risk of 
patent infringement and the associated risk of litigation. 
B. Dynamic Costs 
The patent system can only be justified, given all its costs, in 
terms of dynamic efficiency: the benefits that result from an enhanced 
pace of innovation. Recent events (in particular those surrounding 
Microsoft)41 suggest not only that the economic costs may be higher 
and may last longer than was previously realized, but also that the 
benefits may be lower. In particular, the incentives for research and 
development may be less, and there may be important distortions in 
the way money is spent, that is to say, in the direction of research. 
The patent system, because of its poor design, may be slowing down 
the pace of innovation. 
This raises the question, can one obtain the dynamic benefits—if 
they exist—at lower costs? I will argue that, at least in some cases, 
one can. 
1. The Fundamental Problem: The Disparity Between Marginal 
Private and Social Returns.  The fundamental problem is that under 
the patent system the rewards do not correspond to the marginal 
social returns. 
The marginal social return is having innovation available earlier 
than it otherwise would have been. That is to say, if the idea was 
going to occur anyway to somebody else, then the contribution of the 
“innovator” is just that the idea occurred a little earlier than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
For anyone engaged in research this is well understood, but we 
like to ignore it. I would like to think that if I had not solved the 
 
 40. Just as the high transaction costs faced by retirees would have been viewed as a benefit 
by Wall Street if we had privatized social security. 
 41. See supra notes 16, 23–24 and accompanying text. 
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problem of how markets with asymmetric information work, the 
problem would not have been solved. The reality is that somebody 
else would almost surely have made similar discoveries, maybe the 
next day, the next month, or the next year, or maybe in ten years, but 
it would have happened eventually. I did solve it earlier than anybody 
else did. From a social point of view, my contribution is making this 
knowledge available earlier, and only the extent to which that 
knowledge occurred earlier than it otherwise would have is what 
ought to be rewarded; economic efficiency requires that people’s 
compensation be related to their marginal social returns. 
The patent system does not reward people on the basis of the 
marginal social return of their contribution. It gives the individual or 
firm that is first the entire value of the innovation, which obviously 
can well exceed the marginal social contribution. The benefits to the 
innovator are justified by saying they are a proxy for the marginal 
social contribution, but the returns provided under a patent are a very 
bad proxy. As a result, it introduces a distortion. This is the critical 
insight: we are dealing with second, third, and fourth-best economics. 
First-best economics would have compensation commensurate with 
the marginal social contribution, but unfortunately, it is not easy to 
assess that—it is not possible, in general, to determine when the 
innovation would have otherwise occurred. (First-best economics also 
would provide compensation in a way that does not give rise to 
monopoly distortions.) 
The human genome project is a case where there is a clear 
distinction between what those who obtained patents received and 
their marginal social returns. There was a major international effort 
to decode the human genome, and by the early 1990s it seemed clear 
that it would be done within a few years.42 There was a race, though, 
among the private entrepreneurs to complete the project a little 
faster; they were willing to spend lots of money to finish it a day 
faster, a month faster, maybe at most a year faster. Why? If they 
could decode the genome and identify a gene, say the gene for breast 
cancer, a year earlier, or even a day earlier, they would receive a 
patent. That would mean that anybody who wanted to be tested to 
know whether they had a likelihood of getting breast cancer would 
have to pay a huge amount of money, as they would have a monopoly 
 
 42. Clive Cookson, A Spur for the Gene Hunters: The Mapping of Mankind’s Genetic 
Make-up Sets a Medical Landmark, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 1993, at 12 (indicating that 
the human genome was likely to be decoded “in the first decade of the next century”). 
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on the use of this gene. The biopharmaceutical company Myriad 
received this patent43 and has been using, or I would say abusing, this 
patent. There are others who have been willing to make the 
diagnostic tests free, but those with the patent say no, we own your 
gene. You might think that you own it, but no, they own it. The 
market price for this test is several thousand dollars.44 Of course, if 
you do not have insurance, and nearly 47 million Americans do not 
have insurance,45 it means that you may not be able to afford to have 
this test; most of those who do not have insurance also have limited 
income, so they cannot pay the several thousand dollars required and 
will not get the test. Many of them may die as a result of not having 
the appropriate diagnostic test. 
This is a case where there are clear social costs to the patent, and 
there are very little social benefits from the faster innovation. 
Interestingly, this is a case where other jurisdictions have taken a 
different view. In Canada, the government has said, in effect, this is 
too outrageous and will not allow the patent,46 and so people in 
Canada can get this test much more cheaply. 
There are further distortions associated with patents that I have 
talked about elsewhere. Of particular concern is that much of the 
returns arise as a result of what is called enclosing the commons. 
Professor Boyle here at Duke has used that term, “enclosing the 
commons,” to suggest privatizing something that was (and perhaps 
ought to be) in the public domain.47 In sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Scotland and England, common land that was used, for 
instance, for grazing was enclosed. There was allegedly some benefit: 
privatization led to the more efficient use of the commons. In the case 
of knowledge, however, the enclosure results in an inefficiency, that 
is, knowledge is used less effectively. In short, privatizing knowledge 
 
 43. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995). 
 44. Nat’l Cancer Inst., Genetic Testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2: It’s Your Choice, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Sept. 6, 2007). 
 45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 19 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/ 
p60-233.pdf. 
 46. Caroline Mullen, Gene Tests for Cancer Won’t Stop, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 20, 2001, at 
A3 (indicating that the Ontario government would continue providing the test over Myriad’s 
objections). 
 47. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (Winter/Spring 2003) (“Both overtly and 
covertly, the commons of facts and ideas is being enclosed.”). 
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imposes short-run costs and is only efficient when there are sufficient 
offsetting incentives for more research. 
Biopiracy provides an important instance where it is evident that 
this is not the case. I was first introduced to the concept of biopiracy 
when I was in a small indigenous village in the high Andes of 
Ecuador.48 In this particular village, the mayor went on at great length 
about the problem of biopiracy (the patenting by American and other 
foreign companies of indigenous medicines, plants, or a variety of 
indigenous ideas and traditional knowledge) in Ecuador. In other 
words, biopiracy involves taking what was in the public domain and 
privatizing it. Basmati rice is one example. Another example, in some 
ways more dramatic, concerns the healing property of turmeric. 
Turmeric is a root, used widely as a spice, but which has been known 
in India for its healing properties for hundreds, probably thousands of 
years. Two South Asian doctors working in the United States 
recognized that, under American law, they could get a patent; even 
though the healing properties of turmeric were known in India, they 
may have guessed that the patent examiner in Washington would 
probably not know about those properties. They may have thought 
that, because the healing properties of turmeric were not “published,” 
they had a good chance of getting a patent. But, of course, there is a 
difficulty of publishing things that “everybody” knows—or at least 
everybody except the patent examiner. This presents a classic Catch-
22 situation. You cannot publish it because it is widely known, but if it 
is not published, then it is (from the perspective of the patent 
examiner) “not known.” It is not prior art, and so you can get a 
patent. In the end, the doctors received the patent,49 with the result 
that if India had recognized and enforced this patent, it would have 
meant that anyone in India who used turmeric for healing purposes 
would have to send a check to these Indian doctors in the United 
States in recognition of their patent. This was not a patent that was 
generating research, or an advance of knowledge, in any way. It 
imposed a societal cost, without any corresponding benefit. 
 
 48. I am always astounded by differences in what people know about. Those in the high 
Andes might not know about abstruse aspects of intellectual property, but they knew more 
about how IPR was affecting them and about biopiracy than many specialists in IPR in the 
advanced industrial countries. 
 49. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993). 
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2. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Raising the Cost of 
Knowledge.  So far, I have explained why it is that the returns to 
patents do not correspond to the social benefits. I now want to go 
further and explain why it is that patents may actually slow 
innovation. Knowledge is the most important input into the 
production of knowledge. Intellectual property restricts this input; 
indeed, it works by limiting access to knowledge. One way of thinking 
about this is in terms of any standard production process. If you 
increase the price of an input, it reduces the supply of the output.50 In 
this case, the input is knowledge; patents increase the price of this 
input, which in turn reduces the output. 
3. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Monopolization.  
There are other reasons that patents may impede innovation. One is 
that incentives for innovation are less with monopoly than in a more 
competitive marketplace. There are several reasons for this. First, 
monopolists produce less—because they charge higher prices. 
Because they produce less, the benefit from reducing the cost of 
production by a given amount is less.51 Moreover, monopolists do not 
have the spur of competition. They may realize, in addition, that an 
innovation may lead to a decrease in the value of their existing 
capital. 
Not only do monopolists have a diminished incentive for 
engaging in research themselves, but monopolists can also increase 
their profit by discouraging innovation by rivals and raising rivals’ 
costs. It was, in my judgment, correctly argued that Microsoft did 
exactly this. In fact, one of the charges brought against Microsoft in 
one state was not only that Microsoft’s behavior raised prices, but 
that it actually also slowed down innovation.52 That argument was also 
 
 50. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 304–05 (2d ed. 1997). 
 51. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of Invention, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 619–22 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962). 
 52. Plaintiffs Modified Fourth Amended Petition at 2, Joe Comes, Riley Paint, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp. (Iowa Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) (No. CL82311) (“The purpose and effect of 
Microsoft’s illegal conduct has been to deny purchasers of Microsoft operating systems and 
applications software at a competitive price and free choice among competing software 
products, as well as to deny them the benefit of software innovation.”); see also David Elbert, 
Lawyers for Microsoft Try to Limit Class-Action Suit; Plaintiffs Say the Software Giant Kept 
Innovations from Reaching Consumers, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 23, 2006, at D1. 
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an important part of the European Union’s case against Microsoft.53 
In particular, as Microsoft repeatedly demonstrated its ability to 
leverage its monopoly power in PC operating systems (maintained 
through IPR) into other arenas (by, for instance, squashing rival 
innovators like Netscape), it discouraged innovation further. 
Innovators knew that if they produced a product of sufficient import 
to attract Microsoft’s attention, they would lose the battle with this 
giant. 
4. Why Patents May Impede Innovation: Patent Thickets.  
Another important problem with the patent system arises from 
defining what a piece of intellectual property is. For instance, land 
can be staked out and described precisely, although even then there 
may be boundary disputes. Intellectual property, however, is 
different; it is very hard to define precisely what is your property, 
what is somebody else’s property, and what is in the public domain. 
Intellectual property does not have clear longitude or latitude; it is 
difficult to delineate boundaries. This results in numerable patent 
disputes that discourage innovation, and in a specific problem that is 
called a patent thicket. Patent thickets especially impede innovation. 
Again, this is a problem that has been known for a very long time. 
As I mentioned earlier, one important innovation at the 
beginning of the last century was the automobile; patents almost 
suppressed this important innovation. The other important 
innovation was the airplane, and a patent thicket did impede the 
development of the airplane. Everyone knows about the Wright 
brothers and their first manned flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, 
in 1903; their plane is even depicted on the license plates in that state. 
The Wright brothers obtained some key patents, but so did another 
innovator, named Glenn Curtiss. Thus, it was unclear whom you paid 
if you wanted to develop an airplane. If you paid both of them what 
they demanded, it became too costly to develop an airplane. If you 
paid only one of them, you risked a suit from the other. And so, the 
airplane was not developed until World War I, when it was 
recognized that winning the war was more important than IPR (or 
allowing patent lawyers to make money). The United States 
 
 53. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft of 24 March 2004, supra note 
12, at para. 29 (“The tying of WMP rather shields Microsoft from effective competition from 
potentially more efficient media player vendors, which could challenge its position, thus 
reducing the talent and capital invested in innovation in respect of media players.”). 
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government effectively seized the patents and determined how much 
was to be paid to whom. The development of the airplane proceeded 
very quickly thereafter.54 
5. Distortions in the Patterns of Research.  Patents may not only 
discourage innovation generally, but they also may lead to a 
distortion in the pattern of innovation. On the one hand, research and 
development activity can be directed at circumventing monopolies—
getting around a patent—or, on the other hand, they can be directed 
at strengthening monopolies. Arguably, one of the concerns about 
Microsoft’s new Vista operating system is that it was designed to 
make interoperability more difficult in order to strengthen its 
monopoly power. These research and development expenditures 
actually lower welfare, in contrast with the social returns that arise 
from creating new products and lowering costs, both of which 
enhance welfare. This illustrates the point that stronger intellectual 
property rights may not lead to a faster pace of innovation. 
II.  THE INNOVATION SYSTEM 
As I have said, one needs to look at the patent system, or 
copyright system, within the context of the broader innovation 
system. There are a number of tasks that any innovation system has 
to perform. The first is the selection of projects and researchers. Who 
is going to do the research, and what projects are going to be 
undertaken? The second task is financing. The production of 
knowledge is not costless, so there has to be some way of financing it. 
This is related to the third issue, that of risk absorption; research 
is risky: if you knew the outcome, it would not really be research. 
There is an inherent uncertainty about research. The question is, who 
bears that risk? 
Fourth, any effective innovation system has to provide incentives 
for individuals and firms to innovate (both incentives to work hard 
and incentives to innovate). 
Fifth, a well functioning innovation system has to disseminate and 
use the knowledge when it is produced. 
 
 54. For a discussion of this story, see TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOP’S BOYS: A LIFE OF 
WILBUR AND ORVILLE WRIGHT (1989); SETH SHULMAN, UNLOCKING THE SKY: GLENN 
HAMMOND CURTISS AND THE RACE TO INVENT THE AIRPLANE (2002). 
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In evaluating the different parts of the innovation system, one 
has to ask how well they perform these roles and what costs they 
impose on the rest of the economic system. I already referred to the 
patent system’s high distortionary cost55 as well as the transactions 
costs.56 I would argue that a well-designed innovation system will be a 
mixed system, involving patents and other elements, like prizes and 
government support of basic research, for instance, at a university. In 
assessing our current innovation system, the questions are, are we 
relying too heavily on the patent system? And is the patent system 
well designed for achieving the objectives, or should we reform it? 
A. The Patent System 
The critique of the patent system is that, besides the large static 
and dynamic distortions that I have described, there is a problem of 
distortionary finance. As I said before, under the patent system 
research is financed out of monopoly profits. The difference between 
the price and the marginal cost can be viewed as a tax. In other words, 
one can think of the patent system as combining a competitive pricing 
system with a tax per unit output (the difference between the price 
and the marginal cost of production), the revenues from which are 
devoted to financing research. Part of the problem with the patent 
system, however, is that much of that revenue does not go to finance 
research. The drug companies spend more money on advertising and 
marketing than they do on research.57 Moreover, the directions in 
which they allocate their research budget do not accord well with 
broader social objectives: they spend more money on lifestyle drugs, 
such as for hair regrowth, than they do on lifesaving drugs. So, there 
is a lot of what you might call “leakage” in this particular tax system: 
It is an inefficient tax in failing to deliver the revenue into the 
important areas of research, where it should go. 
Putting that critical problem aside, one can still ask, is it a good 
tax system? Is it a good way of raising revenue for financing research 
and development? The answer is no. It has one property which some 
may think is desirable (although, as I shall explain, I think even this 
property may, especially in this context, actually be undesirable): the 
“tax” is a benefit tax. That is to say, the only people who are 
 
 55. See supra Part I. 
 56. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 57. Marc-André & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 29 (2008). 
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ostensibly58 paying for a heart medicine are the people who use the 
heart medicine, so there is a linkage between who benefits and who 
pays. But in most other areas it is not viewed to be a good thing to 
have a benefit tax, which is why there is relatively little reliance on 
benefit taxes. It is a particularly poor way of raising revenues for 
research on diseases. It is bad enough that a person has a heart 
problem, but then to say because someone has a heart problem then 
he or she should also have to pay for heart research is imposing a 
double penalty. Put another way, within the context of any utilitarian 
or Rawlsian social welfare function, (or any of the other generally 
accepted views of social justice), a benefit tax for medicine cannot be 
justified. There are other public services in which a benefit tax might 
be justified, but not in the areas of lifesaving medicines. 
Financing research through “monopoly power” entails, of course, 
using a distortionary tax, and one of the major areas of advancement 
in public finance in the last thirty years has been the analysis of the 
distortionary and distributive impacts of tax systems. We know how 
to raise revenues in ways that are less distortionary and more 
equitable.59 The “monopoly benefit tax” is more distortionary and 
more inequitable than alternative tax systems. 
There are, in particular, a number of broader inequities and 
inefficiencies associated with patents as a source of finance for 
research. I have noted that knowledge is a global public good, which 
means the benefits can be enjoyed by anybody in the world.60 The 
 
 58. I am quite deliberate in saying that the people who benefit from the drug are 
“ostensibly” the ones who pay, because in fact, few people actually pay for their own medicines 
when it comes to life-saving drugs, such as those dealing with AIDS. In most countries, it is the 
government who bears the cost; in the United States and a few others, some of the costs are 
borne by private insurance companies. In either case, the price system is not working in the 
same way that it does for conventional commodities, like steel or chairs. Individuals do not 
make decisions on their own about what drugs to take, and they normally are simply following 
the directions of doctors. In particular, because someone else is picking up the tab, they, or their 
doctors, pay little if any attention to price. Doctors can be encouraged to pay some attention to 
prices, but the prices that they should be paying attention to are the marginal costs, not the price 
cum “tax” (the monopoly price). That price distorts decisionmaking. 
 59. The general theory is laid out in A.B. ATKINSON & J.E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES IN 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1980). 
 60. Global public goods are any goods of which the benefits accrue to anybody in the 
world. The concept was first articulated in J.E. Stiglitz, “The Theory of International Public 
Goods and the Architecture of International Organizations,” Background Paper No. 7, Third 
Meeting, High Level Group on Development Strategy and Management of the Market 
Economy, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, Finland, July 8-10, 1995. For more information, see Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Global Public Goods and Global Finance: Does Global Governance Ensure that the 
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standard principles of equitable finance say that a public good should 
be financed by those most able to pay.61 Unfortunately, IPR do not, 
for the most part, recognize differences in circumstances other than 
the extent to which profits can be extracted. In other words, IPR will 
(effectively) recognize differences in elasticities of demand (because 
the monopolist can extract more profits when demand is less elastic), 
but not any other circumstances, and therefore inherently represents 
an inequitable way of financing research. 
The bottom line is that raising revenues for financing research 
through the granting of monopoly power cannot be justified by any 
generally accepted principles of public finance. 
There is another problem that has not received adequate 
attention: the bias toward excessive patenting. This bias arises 
because there is an asymmetry between the granting of a patent and 
fighting a patent. When a firm gets a patent, it encloses the commons, 
making private what would otherwise be public; it receives a private 
return for obtaining a patent—regardless of whether the patent was 
or was not deserved. But when a firm challenges a patent, it creates a 
public good, because if it successfully challenges a patent, that piece 
of knowledge enters the public domain, where anybody can use it. 
Thus, challenging a patent is a public good. The result, of course, is 
that there will be an underinvestment in fighting bad patents, and an 
overinvestment in trying to get bad patents. 
The problem is exacerbated by poor procedures, especially in 
granting and enforcing patents in the United States. In Europe, there 
is a process of opposition: those who believe the patent should not be 
granted have an opportunity to express their views to the patent 
office before a patent is granted. 
In America, once granted, the owner of the patent can exclude 
others from using his intellectual property until the patent is 
overturned. The consequences were seen in a dramatic way in the case 
of the Blackberry, which was accused of patent infringement. Even 
though Blackberry challenged the patents—and so far in preliminary 
rulings (two of the rulings are final), all the patents have been 
 
Global Public Interest is Served?, in ADVANCING PUBLIC GOODS 149, 149–64 (Jean-Philippe 
Touffut ed., 2006). Knowledge is an especially important example of a global public good. See 
J.E. Stiglitz,, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308–25 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle 
Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999). 
 61. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 469–70 (3d ed. 2000). 
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rejected—the owner of the patent held Blackberry up for ransom: it 
had to pay over $600 million to keep operating.62 It had originally 
demanded that if the patent was overturned, it get back part of that 
money, but the owner of the patent insisted that the amounts be 
unconditional.63 
Moreover, the legal system can lead to unfair outcomes. The high 
costs of implementing IPR, including the high costs of challenging 
patents, put developing countries at a disadvantage, exacerbating the 
risks of biopiracy. The advocates of the patents often argue that one 
should not worry about biopiracy, because the patents will not 
survive. Even if that conclusion were true (which does not appear to 
be the case), it is very expensive to challenge these patents. India is 
large enough and well enough off that it can afford challenging them, 
but Ecuador does not have the necessary resources. 
Even in the cases in which a patent has been successfully 
challenged in some courts, other courts have not been swayed. This is 
illustrated by another famous example of biopiracy, entailing a 
variety of uses of the neem tree oil, which is used in India for a wide 
range of purposes. The United States and several European countries 
granted a number of patents for some of these uses, even though they 
had been known in India for a long time. In Europe, they were 
challenged, and the challenge was sustained—that is to say, the 
patents were overturned—but the United States refused to overturn 
the patents. Thus, the neem oil patents continue to be enforced in the 
United States even though in another jurisdiction they have been 
overturned.64 
One of the most vocal complaints against the TRIPS agreement 
that I mentioned earlier was that it reduces access to generic 
 
 62. See Susan Decker & Rebecca Barr, BlackBerry Patent Settlement Frees RIM to Head 
Off Rivals, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 6, 2006, at 16. 
 63. There are alternatives to a system in which patent owners can so severely restrict access 
to their innovations. For instance, under the “liability system,” those who use someone else’s 
intellectual property have to pay compensation; but the owner of the intellectual property 
cannot exclude someone from using the property. Even more modest reforms, such as allowing 
the use of intellectual property so long as there is a challenge (with appropriate compensation 
paid if the patent is upheld) would be preferable. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids 
Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2442–48 (1994); Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 33–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13141. 
 64. See Vandana Shiva & Ruth Brand, The Fight Against Patents on the Neem Tree, in 
LIMITS TO PRIVATIZATION: HOW TO AVOID TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING 51, 52–54 (Ernet 
Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Oran R. Young & Matthias Finger eds., 2005). 
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medicines.65 The World Trade Organization (WTO) has its own 
vocabulary, called “flexibilities,” that allow countries to issue 
compulsory licenses for generic medicines.66 The head of the WTO 
has been upset at my public criticisms of TRIPS, especially in those 
lectures in which I explain how the WTO is causing people to die 
because without access to generic medicines, the poor in developing 
countries suffering from life threatening diseases simply cannot afford 
to pay the “brand name” prices. He wrote me to remind me that I was 
forgetting about the flexibilities. But he is forgetting about the 
inflexibilities in these flexibilities. They are designed to make it 
difficult to issue compulsory licenses even for life saving generic 
medicines. If the WTO really were interested in making sure people 
had access to generic medicines, the set of procedures would look 
very different. There might, for instance, be a list of life saving drugs, 
or drugs that addressed debilitating disease, in which any generic 
producer could sell in any country whose income was below a critical 
threshold. Even better would be the reverse presumption: any generic 
producer could sell any drug in any country whose income was below 
a critical threshold unless the owner of the patent substantiated that it 
was a lifestyle drug, of little value in addressing either life-threatening 
or debilitating diseases. 
As it is, not only do the rules make it difficult for developing 
countries to get access to these vital medicines at prices that they can 
afford, but the United States exacerbates the problem by coming 
down hard on any country that attempts to use a compulsory license. 
The United States threatens to take all kinds of other actions (and 
there are a variety of actions that are costly to a developing country 
going against its wishes), even when the country is complying with all 
the rules of TRIPS. So, it is not just how the rules were designed but 
also the way they are being implemented that has made it more 
difficult to get access to these generic medicines.67 
 
 65. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 66. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/Engl 
ish/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf (recognizing the “flexibilities” of the TRIPS 
agreement). 
 67. The provisions on data exclusivity which have been included in many of the bilateral 
trade agreements that the United States has signed have also exacerbated the problem of access 
to generic medicines. Even if a compulsory license is issued, there is an attempt to restrict the 
use of data that might be required to establish the safety and efficacy of the generic drug. 
Although there are changes to the regulatory structures that might allow developing countries 
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Reduced access to generic medicines is one of the most 
important and most visible concerns of the developing countries, but 
there are a whole set of other concerns. One of the complaints of the 
developing countries is that although they are being forced to pay 
high prices for brand name drugs, the current system provides little 
incentive for research and development on the diseases that afflict 
them. I mentioned that the drug companies are spending more money 
on marketing and advertising than on research, and more money for 
research on lifestyle drugs than on lifesaving drugs.68 Almost all the 
money that they spend on lifesaving drugs goes toward diseases 
prevalent in advanced industrial countries, which is predictable. One 
of the problems of being poor is that you do not have any money and 
therefore cannot spend a lot of money on drugs, even though if you 
do not buy the drugs you may die. There is clearly a strong potential 
demand for these drugs from poor countries, but the poor do not 
have the income to convert this potential demand into a real demand. 
The drug companies, of course, realize this; some of them have been 
very upfront about it. They admit that the patent system does not 
provide incentives for developing cures or vaccines for the diseases 
that afflict the poor, especially the poor in developing countries. The 
World Health Organization has finally also recognized that the 
intellectual property regime is not addressing these concerns of the 
developing countries.69 
The other concern, which I mentioned earlier, is the gap in 
knowledge that separates the developing and developed countries: 
TRIPS has made it more difficult to close that gap. More broadly, 
even advocates of free trade, like Jagdish Bhagwati, argue that TRIPS 
should never have been part of the WTO.70 At the same time, as I 
have already made clear, TRIPS provides little protection for the 
 
to circumvent the restrictive impact—for example, simply by requiring generic producers to 
show the bio-equivalence of their product to products that have been shown to be safe and 
efficacious in the United States or Europe—developing countries appear to be under pressure 
not to make the necessary regulatory changes. 
 68. See supra Part II.A. 
 69. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectual 
property/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf. 
 70. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Don’t Cry for Cancún, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 
52, 56–57 (“Intellectual property protection is a matter of collecting royalties, and including 
them in a trade institution such as the WTO seriously distorted what the organization should 
accomplish.”). 
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intellectual property of developing countries. It is not just an issue of 
biopiracy but also protection of biodiversity. This is not, of course, 
just a matter of TRIPS, but also of the Biodiversity Convention—the 
United States has refused to sign the convention that was intended to 
provide some protection for their biodiversity largely because the 
drug companies do not want to pay for the use of genetic materials 
obtained from developing countries. 
Given all of these problems, it is not surprising that the 
developing countries have called for a development-oriented 
intellectual property regime, which I mentioned earlier. It should be 
clear that there is no reason to expect that the design of an IPR 
system, which balances costs and benefits of intellectual property 
protection, that is optimal for the United States would also be optimal 
for developing countries. The developing countries are, as a result, 
calling for a more balanced intellectual property regime, one that 
reflects the costs and benefits to their economies. 
B. Prizes 
One alternative to the patent system is called the prize system. 
This entails giving a prize to whoever comes up with an innovation, or 
at least those innovations that meet announced objectives. For 
instance, the person who finds a cure or a vaccine for AIDS or for 
malaria would get a big prize. If a person comes up with a drug with 
slightly different side effects than existing drugs (but which is 
otherwise no more effective) he or she might get a small prize. In 
other words, the size of the prize would be calibrated by the 
magnitude of the contribution. 
This idea is actually an old one. The Royal Society of Arts and 
Technology have been advocating and even using prizes to incentivize 
the development of needed technologies for some two centuries. For 
instance, they thought it was important to come up with an alternative 
to chimney sweeps; small, underfed boys used to be sent down 
chimneys. It was not good for the health of these young boys and not 
a socially desirable way of cleaning chimneys; but not cleaning 
chimneys meant increasing the risk of fire, with serious consequences. 
Thus, the Royal Society offered a prize to anybody who invented a 
mechanical way of cleaning chimneys. The prize provided an 
incentive, and it worked. A patent system might also have motivated 
the development of a mechanical device (though it did not), but if it 
had, there might have been a problem. The owner of the patent might 
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have been tempted to attempt to maximize the return to his 
innovation by charging a high fee for its use. That might mean that 
only rich families could afford to use the mechanical device, and 
young boys’ lives would have continued to be put at risk. 
There are a whole host of other things for which they have 
offered prizes. 
The current patent system is, of course, similar to a prize system, 
but it is a very inefficient one, because the “prize” is a grant of 
monopoly power, and with monopoly power there are incentives to 
restrict the use of the knowledge. One of the characteristics of a 
desirable innovation system is that the ideas and innovations, once 
developed, be widely used and disseminated, but the patent system is 
designed to restrict the use of knowledge. The alternative is to use the 
competitive market to ensure efficient dissemination; giving a license 
to a large number of people uses the force of competition to drive 
down the price and to increase the usage of the knowledge. In both 
cases, market forces are used: one is the incentive of a monopoly to 
restrict knowledge and raise prices, the other is the market force of 
competitive markets to drive down prices and extend the benefit of 
knowledge widely. 
Moreover, the prize system has the advantage that there is less 
incentive to waste money on advertising and to engage in other 
anticompetitive behaviors designed to enhance monopoly profits. I 
mentioned that the drug companies spend more on advertising and 
marketing than they do on research. These marketing expenditures 
are designed to reduce the elasticity of demand, which allows the 
owner of the patent to raise prices and increase monopoly profits. 
From a social point of view these expenditures are totally dissipative. 
There is today a widespread recognition that drug companies 
have insufficient incentives to develop medicines for the diseases that 
afflict the poor, simply because there is no money in those drugs. One 
of the widely discussed ideas for addressing this problem is a 
guaranteed purchase fund, where the World Bank or the Gates 
Foundation would guarantee one or two billion dollars to someone 
who discovers (and patents) a vaccine or a cure for AIDS or malaria 
or some other disease afflicting the developing world for the purchase 
of the drug. In effect, there would be a guaranteed market. The 
guarantee of purchasing one or two billion dollars of the drug would 
act like a prize, and a sufficiently large guarantee would motivate 
research. These guaranteed purchase funds, however, would still 
maintain the inefficiency of the monopoly patent system. The 
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discoverer receives his “prize”—the monopoly profits—by charging 
monopoly prices. The poor who get the drugs through the guaranteed 
purchase fund do not, of course, pay the monopoly price. But the 
funds are limited. When the funds are used up, a government that 
wants to provide to its citizens, say, the malaria medicine that has 
been incentivized through the guaranteed purchase fund will have to 
pay the full monopoly price. Money spent to purchase this drug at the 
monopoly price is money that cannot be spent on the country’s other 
health needs. It is a transfer payment to the monopolist, beyond what 
the monopolist may have needed to undertake the research. It is far 
better to use the money for the guaranteed purchase fund to offer a 
prize, or to buy the patent, and make it available freely (or to anyone 
willing to pay a limited licensing fee). In short, in areas where there 
are well-defined needs (such as the need to develop a malaria 
vaccine) both the prize system and the patent system can provide 
comparable incentives to undertake research. Both have as an 
advantage over government-funded research that no one has to pick 
who should undertake the research: there is a process of self-
selection; those who think that they have the best prospects of 
succeeding (and are able to finance the research and willing to bear 
the risk) undertake the project. But the prize system uses the force of 
competitive markets to ensure the widespread dissemination of the 
benefits of the innovation; the patent system uses monopoly power, 
restricting the usage, and often distorting the markets in other ways. 
C. A Portfolio Approach to Innovation 
Intellectual Property rights should be part of an innovation 
system that also includes prizes and government-supported research 
and grants (which are probably the most important component of the 
innovation system, in supporting basic research). Each of these has its 
strengths and weaknesses. Table 1 provides a chart of some of the 
attributes of these three alternatives. We should have a portfolio of 
instruments, but, in my view, in the current portfolio, too much 
weight has been assigned to patents. 
The first attribute I list is selection. One problem facing any 
innovation system is how to select those to engage in a research 
project. The advantage of both the patent and the prize system is that 
they are decentralized and based on self-selection. Those who think 
that they are the best researchers make the decision to undertake the 
research. They make the investment, risking their own money, in the 
belief that they have a good chance of winning the prize (the formal 
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prize, or the prize of the patent). The prize and patent systems have 
this advantage over the government-funded research, where there is a 
group of peers (or bureaucrats), deciding who is the best researcher. 
There is obviously, in addition, a concern about “capture” of the 
research-awarding process, for example by political interests whose 
agenda may not be the advancement of science and technology. 
Table 1.  Comparing Alternative Systems 
 Innovation System 
Attribute Patent Prize 
Government-
Funded Research 
Selection Decentralized, 
self-selection. 
Lacks 
coordination. 
Decentralized, 
self-selection. 
Lacks 
coordination. 
Bureaucratic. 
 
More coordination 
possible. 
Finance (tax) Highly 
distortionary and 
inequitable. 
Can be less 
distortionary and 
more equitable. 
Most efficient. 
Dissemination 
Incentive 
Limited—
monopoly. 
Strong—
competitive 
markets. 
Strong. 
Risk  Litigation risk. Less risk. Least risk. 
Innovation 
Incentives 
Strong but 
distorted. 
 
Strong, less 
distorted. 
Requires well-
defined 
objectives. 
Strong non-
monetary 
incentives. 
Transaction  
Costs 
High. Lower. Lower. 
On the other hand, one of the disadvantages of both the patent 
and the prize system is the lack of coordination. From a societal point 
of view, there is the risk of excessive duplication.71 The lack of 
coordination increases the cost of doing research. One of the risks 
that each researcher faces is that he does not know how many other 
people are engaged in that research. That increases the risk someone 
else will get the patent or prize first. Those engaged in research may 
demand increased returns to compensate them for the increased risk; 
 
 71. I say “excessive” because it may in fact be optimal to have several independent, parallel 
research efforts. 
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in effect, the lack of coordination discourages innovation. The 
government-funded research can be more coordinated. 
In regards to finance, the patent system is the worst of the three 
systems. It is highly distortionary and inequitable in the way funds to 
support research are raised—by charging monopoly prices, for 
example, on the sick. By the same token, the transactions costs 
(especially those associated with litigation) and the distortions in the 
economic system are much higher with a patent system than with the 
other two. 
In particular, with respect to the dissemination of knowledge and 
its efficient use, government-funded research is best (because 
knowledge is generally made freely available); the prize system is 
second (though there may be little difference with government-
funded research if, after the prize is awarded, knowledge is made 
freely available, or, if, with government-funded research, the 
government charges a licensing fee); and the patent system is the 
worst, given that it relies on monopolization, which entails high prices 
and restricted usage. In short, under the prize and the government-
funded research systems, knowledge, once acquired, is more 
efficiently used. These are among the key advantages of these 
alternatives. 
There is a very big difference in the nature of the risk faced by 
researchers in the three systems (besides the risks arising from lack of 
coordination, just discussed). In terms of risk, the patent system is the 
worst because of the huge amounts of litigation risk. The government 
is the best because it has the advantages of paying for the input rather 
than the output. That is to say, a researcher gets money for his time 
and other resources spent doing the research whereas in the prize and 
the patent system researchers only get money if their research is 
successful—and successful before their rivals. 
The reason that risk is important is that in equilibrium consumers 
have to pay for the risk borne by researchers. People and firms72 are 
 
 72. The evidence is that capital markets do not fully spread risks faced by firms, because of 
imperfections of information. E.g., Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Asymmetric 
Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 160 (1990) (discussing the effect of information imperfections on firm behavior and 
arguing that informational problems in the capital market cause firms to act in a risk-averse 
manner). There is also considerable empirical evidence that markets do not efficiently distribute 
risk, that is firms act in a risk averse manner, even to risks which are uncorrelated with the 
market. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes 
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risk averse, and if they have to bear risk, they have to be 
compensated for doing so. The patent system makes society bear the 
cost of that risk in an inefficient way. Under the government financed 
research system, the risk is shared by society in a more efficient way. 
The innovation incentives are strong in the patent system, but 
they are distorted,73 whereas the prize system can provide 
equivalently strong incentives that are less distorted. 
On most accounts, the prize system dominates the patent system; 
but the prize system has one limitation: it cannot work when the 
objective is not well defined. That is why the prize system will never 
replace the patent system. At the same time, in basic research—the 
foundation on which everything else is built—government-funded 
research will continue to remain at the core of the innovation system. 
No one has proposed otherwise: the costs of restricting the usage of 
knowledge associated with the patent system far outweigh any 
purported benefits. The debate today revolves only around applied 
research, which often entails translating the knowledge acquired in 
basic research into applications. 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual Property Rights are important, but the importance of 
IPR has been exaggerated, as they form only one part of our 
innovation system. IPR should be seen as part of a portfolio of 
instruments. We need to strengthen the other elements of this 
portfolio and redesign our intellectual property regime to increase its 
benefits and reduce its costs. Doing so will increase the efficiency of 
our economy—and most likely even increase the pace of innovation. 
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 73. They are distorted, as I have noted, because there are incentives to engage in research 
to innovate around a patent, and to spend money in ways that extend the effective life of the 
patent. These innovation distortions are in addition to the other market distortions, for example 
associated with expenditures attempting to make demand curves less elastic. 
